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Let’s Talk: Police Shootings and Reflecting on Them — Part TwoEd. Note: While the below article [of which I am excerpting key areas] was sent last year to over 3,000 police leaders across the country, I do not believe it has had the discussion it deserves. Here are two seasoned senior police officers from a large metropolitan police department attempting to struggle with what I believe is the crucial problem facing today’s police in America – the use of deadly force. These are experienced police leaders and what they are suggesting as to how police agencies should react should become part of policing’s “body of knowledge.”
The authors are Asst. Police Chief Timothy N. Oettmeier spent over 42 years with the Houston Police Department. During his career he rose through the ranks from Police Officer to Executive Assistant Chief of Police. During his career he served as the Director of Training, the city of Houston’s Inspector General, and as an Executive in charge of Patrol, Investigations, and Support Operations and Senior Police Officer Terry A. Bratton spent 39 years with the Houston Police Department. During his career he worked as a Police Officer and Senior Police Officer in Patrol Operations and in the Training Division. He is recognized in State and Federal court as an expert in use of force and officer involved shootings. He has done extensive training in these areas as well as in the use of tactical decision-making.
Read carefully what they have to say and then take steps to incorporate their suggestions into your police department whether you are a police or community leader.]
REFLECTIONS ON POLICE SHOOTINGS: A Look at How Agencies Should React – [Abbreviated and Continued]
Part 2
Timothy N. Oettmeier and Terry A. Bratton
March, 2017
Overcome Serious Officer Safety Training Deficiencies
Having sound policies is one thing, being able to prudently and effectively convey them to police personnel is another entirely different challenge. The primary means of communicating this information is through training and education. Failure to provide timely, reliable, and valid training can be costly in many ways ranging from the loss of life, to sustaining injuries, to being held accountable for acts of vicarious liability (e.g., failure to supervise, failure to train, and negligent retention)…
Thus, it is incumbent upon police executives to take steps to ensure department personnel receive proper training, especially in those high-risk areas such as the use-of-force, mechanics of arrest, search and seizure, and so forth. With the advent of Davis v. Mason County 927 F. 2d 1473 (CA9 1991), police executives were placed on notice that it is not sufficient just to train personnel on how to perform various aspects of their job, but the training must include when the performance should be used. Herein lies the balancing challenge for police managers, supervisors, and trainers – how much time it takes to teach someone how to perform a skill versus how much time it takes to teach someone, when and under what circumstances that skill should be used…
The genesis of any tactical decision-making rests with how one is trained to think and act. At the risk of oversimplifying, there are two tactical training approaches being used in police agencies today: foundational and situational.
The foundational approach focuses on teaching a set of techniques that are universally applied to any incident. This makes it easier for trainers to administer and hypothetically easier for officers to remember. In today’s climate in which police officers are unsuspecting targets of ambushes, it would not be surprising to see agencies starting to drift toward using this approach exclusively.
Contrast this with a situational approach where officers are taught to match techniques to a given incident. Officers would be expected to differentiate which techniques they would use for various types of traffic stops, working with mentally impaired consumers, searching buildings, interacting with recalcitrant persons and so forth.
Neither of these approaches is necessarily incorrect when used; however, the mindset used by officers and anticipated reactions by targeted persons to the techniques used could be a concern. In other words, not every incident requires an assertive, aggressive approach to reach a successful conclusion. Knowing when to compensate for the uniqueness of situations and people is critical for establishing tactical superiority.
Tactical decision-making is important because it governs how officers conduct themselves at an incident. Determining which tactics to use is predicated on scene conditions, the presence of personnel at the scene, and the behavior of the person in question. There is no “continuum” or “pre-designated sequence” regulating which tactics officers should use for a given scene.
The intent of tactical superiority is to create a deterrent effect so the officer is in a position of influencing what occurs during an incident. It can also provide the officer a degree of protection depending on the circumstances encountered. It is in no way a foolproof means of bringing any scene to a successful closure, but used properly, it can increase the probability of bringing an incident to a peaceful resolution.
Tactical Techniques. There are several important tactical techniques officers should be using. It is important to note though that once any of these techniques are used officers should constantly be reassessing their situation before moving forward – and this could take only a matter of seconds (or longer depending on the nature of the situation) to be effective. The techniques listed below are not exhaustive but they merit a simple description for purposes of clarity:
When we look at many police shootings, especially those of late, the tactical techniques used by officers can reasonably be questioned, even those used in situations where a shooting was deemed justifiable.
Furthermore, we suggest the amount of time dedicated to tactical decision- making training in many departments is woefully inadequate…
One need look no further than the Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) 2015 (August) report entitled: “Re-Engineering Training on Police Use of Force.” PERF conducted a survey of member agencies in the Spring of 2015, of which 280 responded revealing topics such as crisis intervention, use of force policy, de-escalation, communication skills were included in recruit and in-service training programs. But the presence of these topics provides no assurances the training is either sufficient or properly balanced in association with other courses offered…
It is not uncommon practice for trainers to create “no-win” scenarios for recruits, even veteran officers as a way of making a point. These situations typically require officers to demonstrate that under justifiable circumstances, they will be able to defend themselves by using deadly force. What tends to get lost in this approach is the fear being instilled within officers…
A successful learning experience for each officer means he or she had an opportunity to participate in relevant training activities. We must not underestimate the value of officers watching their colleagues participate in scenarios different from the ones they were involved in, but the most effective learning comes from personal participation.
Further, participants should know there is seldom one right way to resolve problems within a scenario. Officers subjected to scenario-based training must walk away from the experience being able to distinguish preferred methods from less preferred methods of resolving non-compliant behavior under a variety of circumstances…
For scenario-based training to have value, officers must believe they were challenged to perform in a manner designed to enhance and preserve their safety and the safety of citizens. The question that must be asked is how frequent and intense these types of training are provided to officers during the course of their careers? The answer in many agencies may be far too few.
Firearm training is another core instructional area in need of attention. Firearms instructors have an extraordinarily difficult job of teaching recruits how to handle and shoot their weapons. Still, we must have assurances that if an officer is going to shoot, he or she will do so accurately…
Because of concerns about accurate shooting, it is safe to say in many agencies what gets lost is an emphasis in determining “when” to shoot and “what” can be done to reduce the necessity of shooting.
This may be attributed, in part, to the evaporation of an important training sequence in police academies today. Under “normal” circumstances, the officer’s primary response option is to use non-forceful means to resolve conflict. The exception to this approach is to use non-lethal methods, such as a baton, electronic control device, pepper spray, etc. The exception to the exception is using deadly force.
In examining training curricula, one should not be surprised to find more time being spent on the use of deadly force and the least amount of time on non- forceful protocols.
This has the potential of skewing officers into believing they are more apt to encounter situations where they will need to rely on using deadly force than not. This is further compounded when the use of computerized “shoot-don’t-shoot” software programs are incorporated into a curriculum. There are two significant issues with this approach.
First, it is not sufficiently interactive – the subjects projected do not behave spontaneously so the challenge of handling non-compliant behavior is non-existent. When you exclude spontaneity of a suspect, you automatically reduce opportunities to assess an officer’s decision-making ability…
Second, computer generated scenarios are predicated on only one primary decision, will the officer shoot or decide not to shoot? All other use of force options are off the table and do not apply; this includes negating an officer’s most effective tool – direct communication with a person.
And third, a high percentage of the scenarios presented are shoot situations, which precondition officers to overestimate the likelihood of the necessity to shoot. In actuality, the probability of the officer becoming involved in a shooting situation is extremely small…
A “shoot-don’t-shoot” training program has value, but it must be properly balanced with using other conflict resolution techniques. Ignoring this need to strike a balance in how officers are trained to cope with confrontations could be a contributing factor as to why these controversial shootings are occurring.
It is one thing for the officer to be in a position to justifiably use deadly force but not do so because of his or her ability to de-escalate the situation to the point where less-than-lethal force or no force is used to resolve the situation without jeopardizing their own safety of the safety of others.
Police executives are aware of their responsibility to assure the public they have properly prepared their officers to use force only in those instances when such a response if justified. The public is right to expect officers to know how to use such force. However, it is perhaps more important for each officer to know when that force is appropriate…
If police executives choose to rely on instructors who have extensive military experience, they need to ensure these trainers recognize and understand differences and adjust their conduct accordingly…
Continuity must exist between what is written and what is actually taught, how it is taught, and by whom, which is critical when a particular topic spans multiple training units (i.e., defensive tactics unit, firearms training unit, mental health unit, etc.). One must not forego the importance of having supervisors monitor each segment of an officer-safety training program, or elements thereof.
It would behoove police executives to be knowledgeable about all aspects of the training their officers, supervisors, and managers receive regarding tactical operation techniques. It is no longer sufficient to solely focus on how officer mechanics and rationale were used to justify why an officer shot someone; attention must also focus on actions taken by officers prior to having to discharge their firearm – astute officers will use and rely on what they were trained to do!
Police executives must be prepared to describe and demonstrate what they have done and are doing through their training efforts to help officers handle these types of incidents. If they do not or their efforts are minimal there must be consequences. The more the public knows about these facets of police work, the stronger accountability becomes.
One of the standard procedures for officers who have shot someone is for them to be temporarily reassigned to an administrative job for a set number of days. There is no standard length of time for the officer to remain away from his or her field assignment as it varies among departments, typically ranging from 3 – 5 days, some much longer.
There is value to this practice but in most cases it seldom reaches its potential. On the positive, the removal of the officer from a neighborhood, especially when a questionable shooting occurs, places the officer out of harms way and limits his or her potential to be a catalyst for disorder and unrest.
It also provides the officer time to cope with the psychological after effects of having shot another human being. Officers will react differently to this situation, which is the reason many police executives require involved officers to visit with a psychologist. It is incumbent upon the psychologist to determine when or if the officer is “fit for assignment” in his or her previous field duty. As there are multiple assignment options for officers, it should not always be assumed they will work in their previous capacity.
The real issue with any post shooting protocol is: “what are officers doing while on special administrative assignment?” Paper work, answering phones or similar make work assignments are tantamount to wasting a precious opportunity.
Many agencies have post-critical incident protocols that are used in conjunction with major department operations (i.e., huge sporting events, concert events, and the like), special weapons and tactics unit operations, even major undercover operations. These debriefing sessions are invaluable to an agency as they are designed to examine and critique an operation solely to look for ways to improve how future similar events will be handled. A similar approach must be established for officers who have been involved in incidents where they discharged their firearm.
The goal of this effort must be ensuring the officer has confidence in his or her ability to perform their job. Equally important, they must fully understand how their actions relate to the agency’s policy and the training they have been refreshed on.
This can be accomplished by exposing officers to a multitude of activities that will not only help them cope with the effects of a shooting incident, but will also prove beneficial to his or her colleagues. For example, at the very least, this protocol should include the following activities:
What should be avoided are simulations that result in the officer routinely being killed if any type of mistake is made. Officers do not need to be reminded of this outcome; otherwise they will predominantly be thinking and looking for the proverbial ambush situation, which minimizes using their abilities to focus on applying various tactical techniques. This may be extraordinarily difficult in some jurisdictions given the recent events where officers have been ambushed and killed.
It would be naïve not to acknowledge the importance of aligning this protocol with any legal considerations associated with the incident in question. Officers and their legal representatives will be quick to distance themselves from any requirement in which the officer is “forced” to discuss any aspects of his or her situation (i.e., in a debriefing session) without the presence of legal counsel. This is not insurmountable as debriefing sessions can be similar to peer counseling regimens. It depends on the nature of the questions asked during the session and what the officer feels comfortable in discussing.
Police executives have an obligation to be held accountable for ensuring their agency has a comprehensive and practical post shooting intervention process that focuses on refreshing an officer’s abilities to handle dangerous situations. This should be viewed as a positive opportunity for officers to contribute their experiences for the benefit of others. Plus, it allows officers to refresh and refine their existing capabilities all for the purpose of enhancing their safety awareness.
Lastly, this protocol should be shared with the public, otherwise they are left to believe the reason an officer was moved was because he or she did something wrong, which may not be the case at all. But this does not mean all of the information shared during the protocol should be made available to the public (i.e., the use of specific police tactics). The public should understand officers would go through a process for specific reasons. This process represents a means of transparency for police executives to demonstrate their accountability to them (or lack thereof).
In Closing…
At this point, one might ask: “How do you make this work?” First and foremost, there is no one right way as every police department is different and every police chief and sheriff have varying opinions as to what they believe should be done. What gives us pause is the tendency to approach this issue on a piecemeal basis.
Adopting use of force principles; or modifying existing policies; or subjecting officers to a de-escalation training class in and of themselves may be legally prudent, but what assurances does one have the behavior of officers, supervisors, and managers will actually improve? It is important to acknowledge the gap that typically exists between what is said in a policy, what the training actually achieves, and how well officers, supervisors, and managers are able to demonstrate the relationship between the two. This would suggest the process of integrating policy with training is crucial.
Simply exposing employees to a “revised or existing policy” and subjecting them to a training class does not automatically equate to needed change. Policies should include perspectives from field personnel; otherwise they may stifle the very behavior targeted for improvement. Tactical decision-making cannot afford to be cumbersome especially in situations where every second may count. Protocols must be practiced repeatedly if officers are expected to perform them naturally, without hesitation.
These elements are key components of an overall process in which policy must be integrated with the design and implementation of training; and then, most importantly, training must be repeated over time. The training method must allow personnel to apply the necessary skill sets, articulate why they did so, and then be subjected to constructive critiques.
Keep in mind, supervisors and managers should be exposed to scenarios (role-play or case reviews) and be required to critique the demonstrated behavior of the officer(s). Just because one promotes to a supervisory or managerial position does not mean they know how to critically assess behavior. If we expect them to supervise behavior and manage events, they must receive adequate training that sets appropriate expectations.
To say police work is challenging is a massive understatement. As much as citizens want their police to be effective and successful, mistakes, based on questionable decision-making and ensuing action will be made. When these mistakes occur, especially serious ones resulting in the loss of life, accountability must stretch beyond just assessing blame or justifying actions taken.
Police executives must take a hard look at what they are doing to help officers cope with the rigors of recalcitrant behavior under extremely stressful conditions. They must be willing to critically assess officer decisions and resultant behavior during these incidents and not solely focus on if an officer was justified in discharging his or her weapon at someone. Police shootings are often justified, but seldom are police executives asked if the shooting was necessary. They are just not the same!
Accountability for police executives must expand beyond how these incidents are investigated. Public discussion must also move beyond arguing who should be responsible for investigating these incidents. These discussions are important but they divert attention away from factors that contribute to the outcome everyone hopes to avoid – unnecessary injury or death.
There is much that can be done to improve how these incidents are handled; but police executives must be willing to make the commitment to act. Failure to do so is not only shortsightedness but should also be considered unacceptable.
Let’s Talk: Police Shootings and Reflecting on Them — Part OneEd. Note: While the article below [of which I am excerpting key areas] was sent last year to over 3,000 police leaders across the country, I do not believe it has had the discussion it deserves. Here are two seasoned senior police officers from a large metropolitan police department attempting to struggle with what I believe is the crucial problem facing today’s police in America – the use of deadly force. These are experienced police leaders and what they are suggesting as to how police agencies should react should become part of policing’s “body of knowledge.”
The authors are Asst. Police Chief Timothy N. Oettmeier spent over 42 years with the Houston Police Department. During his career he rose through the ranks from Police Officer to Executive Assistant Chief of Police. During his career he served as the Director of Training, the city of Houston’s Inspector General, and as an Executive in charge of Patrol, Investigations, and Support Operations and Senior Police Officer Terry A. Bratton spent 39 years with the Houston Police Department. During his career he worked as a Police Officer and Senior Police Officer in Patrol Operations and in the Training Division. He is recognized in State and Federal court as an expert in use of force and officer involved shootings. He has done extensive training in these areas as well as in the use of tactical decision-making.
Read carefully what they have to say and then take steps to incorporate their suggestions into your police department whether you are a police or community leader.]
REFLECTIONS ON POLICE SHOOTINGS: A Look at How Agencies Should React – [Abbreviated]
Timothy N. Oettmeier and Terry A. Bratton
March, 2017
The purpose of this article is not to suggest officer involved shootings can be eliminated. These incidents will continue to occur as officers fulfill their duty and obligation to protect citizens or themselves in a manner that may require the discharge of their firearms. These eventualities, however, enhance the public’s right to know why such incidents occur; and necessitate an accounting of the behavior of all involved…
Although the general public supports a majority of police performance; that support does not dismiss interest in those incidents where officer behavior comes under intense public scrutiny. For example, during the past few years, a number of shootings by and of the police have, raised questions and sparked outrage, consternation, and levels of doubt and mistrust of police not seen in our country for several decades. This level of discourse is rooted in an alarming number of questionable shootings where it appears the action taken by the police was not necessary.
Not surprisingly, local community activists and concerned citizens alike have called for more transparency and independence over investigations aimed at police action. Throw in the prevalence and use of cell phone cameras, body cameras, and private security cameras that have captured some events in real time; and it is no wonder some people have jumped to conclusions and loudly demanded immediate justice for victims…
Our concern is the apparent lack of discussion about what can be done to help minimize these circumstances from recurring. In some instances, removing the proverbial “rotten apple(s)” who use force unjustifiably may be sufficient. How the heck they came to join the police is hard to fathom; a concern that speaks to the various selection processes and / or how the duration and intensity of police work affects an individual…
There are two levels of accountability officers are subjected to when they use force.
The initial level of accountability asks if the officer’s action(s) was in accordance with the law. This decision is originally made by prosecutors or a grand jury – although, in rare cases, may involve members of a jury in a court of law. The attention at this level focuses on an officer’s mindset and actions taken when the force in question, especially deadly force, was used.
The claims by some today that police are indiscriminately murdering people, are clearly misinformed about the application of the law. Murder, as with other types of violent crime requires that the mindset and actions of the person must fit within the confines of the criminal statute governing that behavior…
In making these decisions, prosecutors must equate elements of a statute to facts and circumstances of the situation in question, which makes an investigation of the incident extremely critical…
Of particular importance in cases involving police shootings, are those facts surrounding the actual discharge of the officer’s weapon. What was the officer’s mindset; was the act of shooting justifiable within the parameters of State and Federal law, as well as within the terms of how the suspect was behaving the moment the officer’s firearm was discharged; was the suspect armed; was there a belief he or she was armed; or, did the suspect pose an immediate physical threat to the officer, etc.? Not only does the public at large want answers to these questions; so will citizens serving on a grand jury panel or as a jury member in a court of law.
A second form of accountability is administrative and asks if the officer’s actions were compliant with department policies and procedures. These efforts are capable of determining if the officer’s actions were “necessary.” Despite being under the purview of a chief or sheriff, it seldom receives the attention it deserves.
The public should realize policy violations, in and of themselves, might not be violations of the law or one’s civil rights. However, violations of the law and one’s civil rights should always be policy and procedure violations. For this not to occur, means there are serious flaws within an agency’s system of accountability and speak directly to ineptitude on the part of an agency’s leader and executive staff…
There is a general inclination to believe if an officer’s actions were justified in accordance with the law; then those actions certainly must be consistent with policy and tactically correct. But the question is: “While a shooting may be legally justified was it necessary?” Is it possible other tactics could have been used; or, could policies or the training be unclear?
Can officers make an error(s) in judgment prior to having to make a decision to shoot a person? Is it possible an officer’s actions leading up to a fatal encounter were not necessary and were outside the guidelines of policy and training? Was there time and information sufficient to warrant taking a different approach? Instead of escalating the situation by approaching a suspect too quickly with weapons drawn, was it possible for an officer to de-escalate the matter from behind cover?
One must be sensitive to the manner in which the officer acts during these highly stressful encounters. We cannot continue to expect officer responses to be one-dimensional (i.e., always act aggressively) irrespective of the nature of the incident of person(s) involved.
When the officer confronts someone, who is under extraordinary stress, it is doubtful the person and officer will similarly perceive the situation. It is unlikely the person will realize any quick movement he or she takes could have disastrous consequences. For many reasons – fear, obstinacy, naivety, the influence of substances, mental impairment, or simple defiance – many people in distress decline to listen to, let alone cooperate with, an officer.
The convergence of these factors inhibits effective split second decision- making, but they all speak to the issue of “necessity.” A shooting may be justifiable, but it may not have been necessary. Are there instances when a dangerous situation could have been resolved other than with deadly force? I would say for some recent high profile police shooting incidents in the United States the answer is yes.
Knowing the possibility always exists that any officer involved shooting could be justified, but also unnecessary means it is incumbent upon chiefs and sheriffs to demonstrate the thoroughness of their policies governing this action.
Any use-of-force policy should be based on Federal and State laws, as well as valid and reliable law enforcement education and training procedures. While it is an acceptable practice for law enforcement agencies to make their use-of-force policy more restrictive than Federal and State law, it must be flexible and understandable enough for officers as they make split second decisions.
The determination as to whether or not a shooting was “necessary” is strictly dependent upon the sufficiency of an agency’s policy governing the use of force. It is unfathomable to think some police chiefs and sheriffs have no policies or procedures governing this aspect of police work. While I would like to believe this is highly unlikely, it is not so unlikely that these types of policies are deficient in their design. Critics might even argue this is intentional as a way of protecting the police…
Policies are indispensable because they provide the foundation from which standard operating procedures are developed. Together, policies and procedures provide the necessary guidance for officers while minimizing unfettered discretionary decision-making that can hinder an officer’s ability to successfully resolve these incidents.
But what if this guidance is unclear? It is one thing for police chiefs and sheriffs to claim the existence of a policy, but what good is it if employees who are expected to conform find it to be cumbersome or confusing? Even worse is the prospect employees have not been adequately informed about the proper protocol; or have not been subjected to any training opportunities where they can actually work with these directives.
So it begs the question of chiefs and sheriffs, do their policies include concise directives and sufficiently practical guidelines governing the use of tactics in use of force situations? Some police representatives would be quick to say one cannot “legislate” tactical applications for all possible use of force scenarios; thus, the best one can do is ensure officers’ actions are governed by the “objective reasonableness” premise set forth by Chief Justice Rehnquist of the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor – 490 U. S. 386 (1989)…
Police executives need to revisit their policies and procedures to ensure they provide appropriate guidance in how these difficult incidents should be handled. If one can increase the effectiveness of how dangerous scenes are being handled, the probability of unnecessary consequences should be reduced.
The use of force does not in and of itself indicate any Constitutional or policy violation. A series of shootings do not in and of themselves indicate bad policy or training. However, they should be reviewed and various questions asked. A policy may be inadequate or the policy may be fine and the training may not mirror the policy. The officer(s) involved may be an issue. Consequently, the situation must be examined from multiple perspectives including everything from policy and training (recruit, field training – does the culture undo what was learned) to supervision. Generally speaking, if problems exist, they will not be isolated to a singular cause. Thus, police executives seeking to remedy a problem must look at the total picture rather than focusing on only one aspect of it.
In doing this, police chiefs and sheriffs are demonstrating efforts to strictly adhere to the concept that the use of deadly force is truly a last resort to protect life. This absolutely cannot be mere lip service but should be reflected in policies, procedures, training, review processes and disciplinary protocols.
Lack of integrity can be related to investigators failing to ask critical questions that will reveal specific information about action and behavior exhibited by the officer(s) involved in a shooting incident. As authoritative decision makers, police executives have a duty to publicly account for the thoroughness of these types of investigations!
It is naïve to think officers do not make errors in judgment, especially in highly stressful situations. It is the responsibility of police executives to determine through their administrative investigations if such errors actually occurred during the course of the incident. How this occurs is extremely important…
While we agree with the supposition these errors do not equate to a “cause and effect” conclusion; they do constitute justification for holding officers (as well as trainers and supervisors) accountable for their decisions and accompanying actions. There is no guarantee any action taken by the officer, short of shooting someone, will result in a person altering their behavior. But if one can minimize the occurrence of these errors, there is at least a probability that a different outcome could be produced.
It is important to understand the relationship between the concept of “necessary” and officer performance characterized by the presence of tactical errors. First and foremost, even if an officer’s performance is error free, a person could still be shot and injured or killed – and in such a circumstance, the shooting could be both justified and necessary.
However, what about instances when the officer makes one or more errors; or the officer commits a “critical error,” one that has more implications associated with it than others, does this mean the resultant shooting was not justified? The answer can still be no, it can still turn out to be justified; and even if errors were not made, there are no assurances the outcome would have been any different. But, one must not ignore the possibility that if these errors had not been committed, perhaps the shooting could or should have been prevented.
What we can be assured of is the commission of these errors may have unnecessarily placed both officer and the person of interest in a precarious situation. An officer’s actions may prompt a citizen to act in an unexpected manner. Conversely, a person’s actions may result in an officer taking unnecessary risks, which could lead to further escalation of tension and stress between the two parties.
Thus, a thorough investigation must move beyond just providing officers an opportunity to describe what happened and why. If one were to use the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police example, questions should be formulated in accordance with the 11 potential errors made at these scenes. Responses to these inquiries will have significant policy and training implications.
From this, the types of information to determine if circumstances existed that would have allowed officers to act differently – or, justify police actions as they occurred – will logically flow. At the very least, the following questions should be a part of the investigative protocol:
The purposes of asking these questions are multifaceted. First, it is important to learn lessons from one’s experiences, especially if the lessons learned will enhance officer safety while handling dangerous situations. The collective information gleaned from answers to these questions can be plugged into training protocols.
How else are officers expected to learn from their colleagues’ mistakes or replicate successes? Knowing how and when to do so is the essence of providing officers with tactical technique training.
Second, officer actions can be used to enhance policies and procedures. The amount of guidance or implied discretion within a given policy or procedure may require more clarification to help officers with their decision-making process. The practicality and utility of any policy or procedure must be commensurate with the officer’s ability to understand the policy or procedure’s value in helping him or her resolve an incident successfully.
Third, answers to these questions will assist executives in determining the relationship between the existence of errors (if any) and the eventual outcome of an incident, whether a shooting occurred or not. If the officer decides to use his or her firearm (or other types of force); then it is critically important to acquire information as to why this decision was made. How else is the “necessity” of the weapon’s use to be determined?
It is a reasonable expectation for the public to hold their police chief or sheriff accountable for not only asking these questions, but also for using this information to improve officers’ abilities to effectively handle dangerous incidents.
Vulnerability can best be described as the officer inserting him or herself to a dangerous encounter without use of proper tactics, such as cover or concealment, as a means of protection. Said differently, the officer places him or herself in harms way without considering or using elements at a scene to serve as a barrier of protection prior to interacting with the person.
In far too many instances, officers place themselves in positions of vulnerability by advancing on a known perceived threat to minimize danger by asserting control over someone. There are other times when officer vulnerability is the result of receiving and acting on incorrect or misleading information.
Time after time we find officers stating they were in fear for their life because they saw or thought they saw a person display a weapon in a threatening manner; grab for the officer’s weapon during a physical confrontation, or, make an overt movement leading that officer to believe that the person was about to obtain a weapon.
Overt movements are particularly difficult for officers, especially at night when an officer has a more limited view of the person’s clothing or vehicle or the person is non-responsive to the officer’s directives.
Depending on the officer’s proximity to the person, if the officer decides to shoot, he or she will claim self-defense because of the perception risk driven by the perception of the person being armed and posing as a threat to the officer’s life or another person’s life. By approaching the scene differently, however, to insure less vulnerability, the outcome would likely be different.
While there are no universal protocols, because these situations are fluid and unpredictable much of the risk felt by officers is likely strongly correlated to the vulnerability they feel. As such, rather than focus exclusively on the decision at the point force was applied, attention should also be directed to the actions of all parties prior to the deadly force moment.
In other words, did officers place themselves in a situation where they felt deadly force was needed as a means of resolving a situation they contributed to creating? A few examples are worth mentioning to illustrate this point.
The difficulty associated with these instances is the pursuing officer knows that at any moment circumstances may turn and they may find themselves being confronted by the person they were pursuing. The obvious risk involved makes it likely the officer will perceive vulnerability making him or her hypersensitive to an “overt movement” made by the fleeing person.
These three examples demonstrate how officers can contribute toward the creation of their own vulnerability. This is further exacerbated when officers feel pressured by time to resolve a situation. Time is driven by the perception of impending danger and the need to prevent what is danger from occurring or worsening. Officers need to distinguish when this perception is accurate and when it is not. They must not see time as an enemy; rather time, in many instances, can be an advantageous tool.
Whenever possible the preferred option is for officers to slow down how they process and conduct themselves at a scene, which in turn may allow for interaction to occur, or to assess other ways of handling a person. We believe this is one of the primary reasons most officers successfully diffuse dangerous incidents; they know how to effectively manage time and their responses to a person’s behavior. The removal of vulnerability can buy the officer time, which in turn can help determine if their initial perceptions about a person are accurate.
The presence of the officer’s self-induced vulnerability as a factor in any shooting incident should raise a red flag for investigators. While one’s vulnerability does not automatically equate to inappropriate behavior, the probability exists such behavior can be inconsistent with operational and training policies and procedures. This then, becomes a major concern an administrative investigation must address – what is the relationship between the origin of officer vulnerability and the necessity of a shooting?
Whenever officers contribute to being controlled by a situation, they are likely to be vulnerable. Vulnerability affects one’s perceptions, which in turn, can adversely affect the officer’s tactical decision-making. Officers must seek, whenever possible, to protect themselves first by minimizing their position of vulnerability especially when handling dangerous incidents. Police leadership has an obligation to enforce this mindset with viable policies, procedures, and realistic training protocols.
[Continued tomorrow]
“The difference between you and me, David, is that your opponents come after you on a daily basis, my opponents go after me every four years at election time” — Former Dane County Sheriff Bill Ferris.
Years ago, I remember the late Dane County Sheriff and close friend of mine, Bill Ferris, saying to me as I was battling yet another challenge during my early days as a police chief, “The difference between you and me is that your opponents come after you on a daily basis, my opponents go after me every four years at election time.”
I haven’t thought much about electing police chiefs until recently. In fact, if you’d queried me on the subject prior to Ferguson, I would have been adamantly opposed to the idea. Now the Milwaukee city council (with opposition by the mayor) is calling the question by proposing the chief of police in their city be an elected office. Will this be the ultimate growth of true Community-Oriented Policing? I mean, won’t the election of a police chief involve the community more in how they want their police to be led? Is this our future?
Watching police chiefs over the years and having been one for a quarter of a century in two cities, I am reconsidering my position on this matter. I am doing so because some of the most dramatic changes I have seen since Ferguson have been accomplished by elected sheriffs. (Notably: Scott Thomson in Camden, NJ.)
Having said this, I can also identify sheriffs around the county who represent what I would call the worst of policing (think Joe Arpaio). But then again I reassure myself that communities do get the kind of police they deserve or are unwilling to engage.
I am not suggesting that the problems I see in policing today (how and when physical force is used, resisting openness and accountability, the implementation of city-wide neighborhood policing, the practice of Procedural Justice organizationally and in the community, and the visible and factual improvement of community trust) might just be better accomplished by chief executives who are strongly committed and highly accountable to the community/communities they serve. Electing the chief of police would, as they say, put more “skin into the game.”
My sense also is that electing police chiefs would put a strong interest in a candidate who is able and accountable to serving everyone in the community and not what often appears today.
I say this because the mayor-police chief relationship is often one that is peppered with local politics that sometimes go far beyond what the police executive feels is the proper way to proceed. I could even argue that in most major cities today (where the mayor appoints the chief of police) there exits a de facto political relationship that waters down police accountability to those who are most likely to have contact with police.
In the U.K., they recently restructured their system of policing and established elected police commissioners to oversee chief constables (chiefs of police). The system has been in operation for a number of years now and seemingly did not result in the catastrophe predicted by many chief constables.
Yet I know that if we really want lasting change and continuous improvement within the ranks of our police it is going to take a leader who has time to do this outside of partisan politics and has at least a seven-year term to implement needed changes. Without that, you can simply kiss police reform goodbye!
So, what I am suggesting is that we strongly consider police chief elections as a local option — such as what some council members in Milwaukee are proposing — and see how it works. If it works well, other cities may consider this option. If it doesn’t, well, we most likely won’t have lost much.
